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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the case at hand, Summary Judgment was improperly granted 
for Defendants based on their assertions that Plaintiffs had not 
suffered a compensable injury and that there was no material 
issue of fact for the trier of fact to decide. Plaintiffs refute 
both of these premises and request that their action be 
reinstated. There remain many genuine issues of fact to be 
resolved, including: the extent of Plaintiff's injuries, present 
and future; the extent and reasonableness of Plaintiff's 
emotional distress and fear of cancer; and the medical necessity 
and extent of future monitoring for asbestos related disease. 
Plaintiffs have suffered a compensable injury resulting from 
defendants negligence. Plaintiffs have undisputedly been 
exposed to large quantities of concentrated asbestos dust. 
Numerous courts have correctly recognized the exposure to known 
toxic substances, including asbestos, as an injury at law. 
Courts have relied upon the overwhelming medical data which 
establishes that victims exposed to asbestos face reduced 
physical capacity beginning as soon as 6 months after exposure. 
A large percentage of victims will also die prematurely due to 
asbestos induced cancer and/or asbestosis. 
Although the general public may have an occasional encounter 
with small amounts of asbestos, Plaintiffs' exposure was intense 
and constant, and far from the casual exposure that Defendants 
suggest. In fact, Plaintiffs inhalation of asbestos occurred for 
many hours a day over two months, in clouds so thick they 
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frequently had to stop work to clear their airways and wipe it 
from their glasses, (R.476-477, 006.) 
The Plaintiffs received a toxic injury as a direct result of 
the breach of duty defendants owed their workers to provic a 
toxin-free work environment. Had the general public askec ibout 
the contents of the toxic dust and then relied on the false 
assurances of the Defendant that it was inert, they too would 
be outraged. 
The circumstances of Plaintiffs1 toxic exposure are 
outrageous. Mountain Fuel denied the existence of asbestos 
during their renovation project, assuring plaintiffs that the 
dust permeating their work space was inert, negligently refusing 
to test it, when in fact it was highly concentrated asbestos. 
Many legal commentators have addressed the seeming inability 
of tort law to properly deter toxic offenders and compensate 
victims, noting that for some, it is less expensive to risk 
exposing workers, than to have the hazards safely removed. This 
appears to be the case with Mountain Fuel, whose representatives 
were more concerned with losing tax credits than making their 
basement project safe for workers. (R.007). 
Exposure to asbestos causes severe respiratory impairment, 
cancer and death. The latency period between exposure and 
manifest disease can be many years, allowing those responsible 
for negligent exposure to escape any payment of compensation for 
2 0+ years. Even when plaintiffs become fatally ill, offenders 
may not be required to pay because of the difficulty of proving 
2 
causation so long after exposure. In response, courts are 
recognizing the barriers faced by legitimate toxic tort victims 
and attempting to adjust tort law to equitably address injury by 
toxic tort. This includes recognizing the invasion of the body by 
a toxic substance as an injury, providing a quantifiable basis 
for recovery. In cases of injury similar to Plaintiffs', courts 
have allowed victims to recover for fear of cancer, emotional 
distress proximately caused by the negligent exposure, fear of 
disease, emotional distress associated with increased medical 
monitoring, and for medical surveillance. These represent the 
major theories whereby the courts may deter toxic 
irresponsibility and compensate unconsenting victims. 
In light of the many material issues of fact, Plaintiffs 
believe the trial court improperly awarded summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that their action be remanded to 
the trial court to resolve the genuine issues of fact that have 
been raised in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE EXISTS ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is appropriate under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c) only when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. Defendants state in their brief that, "In the present case 
Plaintiffs have introduced absolutely no evidence that would 
raise an issue of material fact". (Brief of Appellee at 13). 
This is simply not true. Summary judgment was improperly 
granted, because there is evidence before the court to raise 
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numerous issues of material fact. 
According to Defendants1 brief, Dr. Battigelli stated that 
M[t]he workers by and large denied acute bouts of coughing, 
choking and related symptoms which would suggest overwhelming 
exposure." (R.373) (Brief of Appellees at 4). These statements 
are directly controverted by Plaintiffs in their depositions and 
interrogatories. For example, Plaintiff Hansen stated that he 
experienced coughing, respiratory distress, chest tightness, 
headache and eye irritation as a result of the immediate exposure 
to asbestos. (R.251). Plaintiff Hilton stated that he 
experienced coughing, wheezing, tightness in the chest, and eye 
irritation during the period of asbestos exposure. (R.271-72). 
Plaintiff Silcox experienced severe coughing and respiratory 
distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye irritation". 
(R.309-310). Plaintiff Vickers experienced coughing, wheezing, 
shortness of breath, chest tightness, headaches and severe eye 
irritation. (R.328). In the face of these complaints, Dr. 
Battigellifs report states that he did not find "any evidence of 
adverse effects" from the asbestos exposure. These conflicting 
statements certainly raise genuine issues of material fact. 
Other issues of material fact include the extent of 
Plaintiffs1 injuries. Plaintiffs continue to experience "adverse 
effects" from the exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff Hansen 
continues to experience shortness of breath and re-occurring 
chest colds, (R.242-43). Plaintiff Silcox continues to suffer 
from congestion, coughing and shortness of breath, all due to 
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exposure to the insulation containing asbestos (R.468). 
Plaintiff Vickers continues to suffer from wheezing and shortness 
of breath. Once again, these statements contradict Dr. 
Battigelli's statement that Plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos was 
"perhaps inconsequential" (R.372-74), clearly raising another 
issue of material fact. 
Another issue of fact is whether the Plaintiffs' emotional 
distress is reasonable. Each Plaintiff has suffered from severe 
anxiety associated with the uncertainty of their future medical 
condition, and they all anticipate undergoing periodic testing 
for asbestos related disease. Plaintiff Hansen experienced 
anxiety and sleeplessness, worrying about potential injury. 
(R.243). Plaintiff Hilton stated that he suffered "loss of 
sleep, worrying about what might happen in the future due to 
exposure to asbestos". (R.272). Plaintiff Mackintosh experienced 
severe anxiety regarding his future medical condition. (R.292). 
Plaintiff Vickers experienced severe anxiety associated with the 
uncertainty of his future medical condition, (R.321-22). 
Medical monitoring for asbestos related exposure, raises yet 
more issues of material fact. There is extensive medical 
literature before the court regarding the medical necessity of 
monitoring for victims of asbestos exposure. The overwhelming 
majority of literature indicates that medical monitoring is 
required beyond the scope of routine check-ups for asbestos 
exposure victims. 
These issues are founded in case law and solid legal theory, 
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not merely upon "unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs" (Brief of 
Appellees at 13). As such, Plaintiffs request a review of the 
evidence and authorities in the light most favorable to them, and 
that the District Court's granting of summary judgment be 
reversed. 
II. PLAINTIFFS1 INJURIES SHOULD BE 
RECOGNIZED AND COMPENSATED. 
Plaintiffs1 inhalation of asbestos at the Mountain Fuel 
building resulted in immediate and prolonged coughing, wheezing, 
chest tightness, headache, respiratory distress and eye pain. 
(R. 251, 242-43, 271-72, 309-310, 321, 328). While these 
reactions may simply be characterized as symptoms of asbestos 
exposure, they may also be fairly characterized as injuries in 
and of themselves. Certainly, the coughing, wheezing, headaches, 
eye irritation, etc., is no less of an injury than are minor cuts 
and bruises which are commonly compensated in other personal 
injury actions. As Judge Handler points out, "to deny redress 
for (their) injuries merely because damages cannot be measured 
with precise exactitude would constitute a perversion of 
fundamental principles of justice." Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 
421, 433, 404, A.2d 8 (1979) (Handler, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
Judge Handler further stressed, in Ayers v. Jackson 
Township, 106 N.J. 557, 318 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), that "it is 
self-evident that exposure to highly toxic chemicals is the 
infliction of harm, an invasion of a legally protected interest." 
318 A.2d at 317. Likewise, the Plaintiffs suffered the invasion 
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of asbestos fibers the moment the fibers were inhaled. Judge 
Handler further stated, 
The injury involved is an actual event: exposure 
to toxic chemicals. The tortious contamination, 
moreover, is an event that has surely occurred; it is 
not a speculative or remote possible happening. Among 
the consequences of this unconsented-to invasion are 
... a tangible risk of a major disease, a peril that is 
real even though it cannot be precisely measured or 
weighed. The peril, moreover, is unquestionably 
greater than that experienced by persons not similarly 
exposed to toxic chemicals." 
Id. at 319. 
The Plaintiffs' risk is similarly high. Asbestos fibers 
never leave the lung tissue once inhaled. Unlike toxic chemicals 
which one's body may excrete over time, asbestos fibers remain 
and frequently cause a plethora of respiratory ailments and 
carcinomas. The victims have only to await the fateful day of 
their diagnosis. Medical surveillance and early detection are 
their only hope. 
Many courts and legal commentators have addressed the tort 
law's seeming inability to adjust to the modern age of toxic 
torts and latent disease manifestation. 
American courts are struggling to accommodate 
common law tort doctrine to the peculiar 
characteristics of toxic substance litigation. There 
is considerable debate among those involved in the day 
to day dealings with personal injuries from the 
industrial processes and products....In large part, the 
problem has been how to adapt traditional tort rules to 
toxic exposure cases-cases involving fact scenarios 
that were wholly unforeseen when these rules were 
originally formulated. 
Note, Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 1081, 
1090-1091 (1989). 
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Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs' action for injury is 
premature and that the discovery rule will allow the Plaintiffs 
to recover when and if disease manifests itself• (Brief of 
Appellees at 12). Tolling of statutes of limitation by the 
discovery rule until serious disease manifests itself is o:„a step 
courts have taken in an attempt to deal with the latent effects 
of asbestos disease and preserve a toxic tort victim's cause of 
action. However, future compensation is doubtful. Critical 
evidence is lost when plaintiffs are forced to wait years to 
litigate. The 2 0 to 3 0 year latency period is a practically 
insurmountable barrier to proving causation. Additionally, res 
judicata may completely bar a future law suit if a plaintiff has 
brought an earlier action to recover other damages from exposure. 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 849, 920 
(1984). Therefore, tolling of the statute cannot be viewed as 
the answer to toxic tort claims absent disease. Compensation for 
victims is doubtful and the tort law's objective of deterrence is 
unfulfilled. 
Another theory adopted by some courts for dealing with toxic 
torts is that of increased risk of future disease. Under this 
damage theory, a plaintiff must prove that the future disease is 
more likely than not to occur. If the plaintiff can prove that, 
he will then recover full damages as if he had the actual 
disease. A minority of courts will reduce damages by the 
percentage probability that the plaintiff will not contract the 
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disease - once the likelihood of disease is proven to be greater 
than 50%. Marchant, Baram, The Use of Risk Assessment Evidence 
to Prove Increased Risk and Alternative Causation in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 40 FICC Quarterly 95, 97-100 (1990). In either case, 
if the plaintiff cannot reach the greater than 50% threshold, he 
will recover nothing. Some courts view this threshold as 
unreasonably high, and have considered sub-cellular and genetic 
damage as triggering occurrences for recoverability. Id. at 100-
101. 
Courts that recognize increased risk actions have adopted 
varying theories of what constitutes a present injury. Some 
courts require a physical manifestation of an injury in order to 
recover while others have no such requirement in regards to toxic 
torts. Among the latter, the mere exposure to asbestos qualifies 
as an injury1 or the increased risk of disease itself satisfies 
the injury requirement.2 Other courts treat general symptoms 
such as dizziness, headaches and nausea as sufficient present 
injury for increased risk recovery.3 Id. Under these 
precedents, which represent the minority, plaintiffs may be able 
-^Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 
(5th Cir. 1985) 
2Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir. 
1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 
305 (1987); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 
885 (Cal. App. 1990). 
3Haqerty v. L&L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317 
(5th Cir. 1986); Villari v. Terminex Int'l Inc., 692 F. Supp. 
568, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
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to sustain an action for increased risk. However, once again, 
the likelihood of proving greater than 50% probability that each 
of the plaintiffs will contract cancer or asbestosis is grimm. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs have chosen not to pursue damages foi 
increased risk as Defendants suggest, because the burden ot proof 
is too high and incompatible with toxic exposure. Rather, 
Plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries sustained at the time of 
exposure. 
III. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Under current Utah law of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, a present injury is required. However, Plaintiffs 
encourage the Court to recognize the almost insurmountable 
barriers faced by toxic tort victims. In recognition of this, 
Plaintiffs encourage the use of two theories which may reduce the 
burden of proof to a reasonable level wherein legitimate victims 
can be compensated for their actual harms. 
First, the Court should allow the verifiable and significant 
exposure of a victim to toxic/carcinogenic substances as meeting 
the barrier requirement for injury. This view is supported by 
Brafford v. Susguehar-a Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Colo. 1984). 
Secondly, Plaintiffs encourage the Court to focus on the 
negligence of the defendants which resulted in the emotional 
distress. The fact that there was a duty which was negligently 
breached should mitigate the requirement of present injury. This 
view is represented in the recent case of Gerardi v. Nuclear 
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Utility Services, 566 N.Y.S. 2d 1002 (Sup. 1991), wherein the 
Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of 
emotional distress. The facts of Gerardi are similar in that the 
defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty and negligently breached 
that duty. Like Mountain Fuel, the Gerardi defendants 
negligently failed to warn their workers of the asbestos, during 
a renovation project. The case at hand is even more egregious in 
that the defendants falsely denied the presence of asbestos when 
they were confronted with it. The Gerardi Court opined that, "in 
the circumstances where a duty is owed by a defendant to 
plaintiff, breach of that duty resulting directly in emotional 
harm is compensable though no physical injury has occurred." Id. 
at 1005 (cites omitted). 
Defendants claim that should the trial court's decision be 
overturned concerning emotional distress, "it would invite an 
unlimited number of claims for emotional distress, an injury that 
is easily feigned". (Brief of the Appellees at 28). A number of 
well reasoned cases have pointed out two factors of toxic tort 
cases which will limit "spurious" claims and allow only 
legitimate emotional distress to be compensated. In order to 
recover for emotional distress most courts require an injury. 
Plaintiffs have been injured by the exposure of their bodies to 
lethal fibers. The invasion is an actual event which has 
undisputedly occurred. The courts, in requiring an injury, are 
looking for an actual verifiable event whereby unfounded or 
spurious claims may be weeded out. The invasion of the body by a 
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known carcinogenic offender provides such a verifiable event. 
The actual event of exposure to a toxic substance provides "a 
certain guarantee" that plaintiffs1 "fear is genuine". Potter v. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 891 (Ca App. 
6 Dist. 1990) (Plaintiffs allowed to recover for emotional 
distress for exposure to hazardous chemicals absent present 
physical injury). 
The second barrier to spurious claims is the reasonableness 
of the Plaintiff's emotional anxiety. This may be established by 
evidence of the increased risk of cancer or other serious 
diseases. 
"In fear of cancer claims the central focus 
is not on the underlying odds that the future 
disease will in fact materialize. The 
plaintiffs increased risk need only be 
reasonable and reasonable in this context is 
not equivalent to probability or certainty, 
but is for a fact-finder to determine." 
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303 
(W.D.Tenn 1986), Rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 
1988). See, also, LaVelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 
30 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 507 N.E.2d 476, 481 (C.P. Cayahoga 
County 1987). Clearly, Plaintiffs1 emotional distress is 
reasonable, based upon their vastly increased risk of 
developing cancer or serious diseases incident to their toxic 
exposure. 
IV. MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE DAMAGES ARE 
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to medical monitoring damages 
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because they meet the criteria that have recently evolved in 
toxic tort cases. Most courts which have recently examined 
the issue of medical surveillance damages have boiled their 
analysis down to essentially three elements. In order for 
the victim to recover they must show: (1) exposure to 
hazardous/toxic substance; (2) the latent potential for 
injury or increased risk of disease due to the nature of the 
exposure; and (3) the medical necessity of early detection. 
These elements are set out in Merry v. Westincrhouse Elec. 
Corp., 684 F.Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988) and supported by 
considerable case law.4 
Like most toxic tort victims, Plaintiffs can easily 
establish the first two elements through the facts of the 
case by proving they have been exposed to a toxic substance 
which is known to cause serious disease. The medical 
necessity and reasonableness of medical monitoring for these 
Plaintiffs is supported by the facts of this case remaining 
an issue for the trier of fact. 
4See, Ayers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 
461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983); Habitants Against Landfill Toxants 
v. City of York, No. 84-5-3820 (York Co. May 20, 1985) 15 
Envtl.L.Rep. 20937 and Villari v. Terminex. Inc., 663 F.Supp. 
727, 735 n. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Friends for All Children, Inc. 
v. Lockheed Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See, also. 
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, 566 N.Y.S. 
2d 1002 (Sup. 1991); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 
79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Askev v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 477 
N.Y.S. 2d 242, 102 A.D.2d 130 (1984); Barth v. Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Co., 661 F.Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Mauro v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 225 N.J.Super. 196, 542 A.2d 
16 (1988); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 
556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985), 
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Defendants down play the necessity of medical monitoring. 
However a survey of medical literature indicates that 
monitoring for those with asbestos exposure is a medical 
necessity. The range of potential disease that the 
Plaintiffs are now at risk include; in-the-lung malignant 
mesothelioma; bronchial carcinoma, diffused pleural 
thickening, discrete pleural thickening (plaques), benign 
pleural effusion, asbestosis (fibrosis). There is also 
compelling evidence that asbestos exposure increases the risk 
of developing cancer of the colon, stomach, rectum, kidney, 
larynx and respiratory tract. Selikoff, I.J., Hammond, E.C., 
Seidman, H., Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in 
the United States and Canada, 1943-1976. 330 Ann NY Acad Sci 
91, 91-116 (1979). 
Dr. Battigelli told the Plaintiffs that their exposure to 
asbestos was "perhaps inconsequential", (R.373). Dr. 
Battigelli's opinion to the Plaintiffs flies in the face of 
the bulk of medical research and literally hundreds of 
articles and works documenting the lethal pathology of 
asbestos in the body. It is generally accepted that intense 
exposure to asbestos in even relatively short periods of time 
has potentially fatal consequences. The New York Academy of 
Sciences has reported that exposure to asbestos "for as short 
a period as one month showed a clear excess risk of cancer. 
With longer direct exposure (i.e. 2 months, 3 months, 6 
months and so on) the cancer risk became greater." Selikoff, 
14 
et al., supra at 61. 
Because of the insidious nature of asbestos related 
disease, medical surveillance after exposure is vital. 
Although asbestos diseases are ultimately incurable, their 
early detection can lead to a decrease in premature morbidity 
and mortality. The early detection of cancer can improve 
prognosis and short-term morbidity. Early recognition of 
non-malignant disease can result in preventative and rapid 
treatment measures for pulmonary infections. G. Peters & B. 
Peters, Asbestos Disease Update 118 - 121 (1989) . 
Despite Defendants suggestion, medical monitoring for 
asbestos disease goes beyond the scope of routine medical 
check-ups. The standards established by the government for 
exposed workers specifies that special attention be paid to 
the pulmonary, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal systems by 
specialized physicians. Peters, supra, at 124. A medical 
monitoring program must be tailored to each victim. Common 
elements would likely include an extensive 
medical/occupational history and examination, two view chest 
x-rays, spirometry, radiography and examinations with an 
occupational medicine specialist, pulmonologist and 
radiologist with experience in reading chest films for 
pneumoconiosis. Id. Frequency of examinations depend on 
risk factors (i.e. age, exposure) determined from the 
occupational history and baseline examination. Jd. at 
125. 
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The Defendants suggest that medical surveillance damages 
are speculative and as such should not be allowed under Utah 
law. (Brief of Appellees at 3 0). Many courts and legal 
commentators believe that medical monitoring damages are 
lawful and appropriate damages for toxic tort victims. e 
third circuit opined that medical surveillance damages are a 
less speculative claim, "because the issue for the jury is 
the less conjectural question of whether the plaintiff needs 
medical surveillance. " In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 
916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990). Paoli is a case wherein 
the plaintiffs were exposed to the carcinogenic toxin PCB. 
The Court acknowledged the many policy reasons for medical 
monitoring in ffa toxic age" and stated that, "recognizing 
this tort does not require courts to speculate about the 
probability of future injury. It merely requires courts to 
ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of 
medical supervision is appropriate". Id. at 852. 
The focus in Paoli was properly placed on plaintiffs need for 
medical surveillance. 
Defendants have pointed out that the majority of cases 
awarding surveillance damages have dealt with exposure to 
toxic chemicals. Asbestos is similar to the carcinogenic 
chemicals in the chemical exposure cases cited because 
asbestos exposure also results in sub-cellular changes and 
cancer. Asbestos exposure may also be distinguished from 
chemical exposure in that research has found that where 
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carcinogenic chemicals may be eliminated by the body through 
time, asbestos will remain embedded in the body tissue 
because of the nature of the microscopic fibre. 
Defendants place much emphasis on the case of DeStories v. 
City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App. 1987) for the 
argument that plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for 
medical monitoring. DeStories is an asbestos exposure case, 
but one that is isolated and seems out of step with much of 
the current legal thought. More recent cases encourage the 
public policy arguments of corporate responsibility. 
Mountain fuel has received the benefits of the asbestos at 
their facility and now should be held responsible for the 
harm. 
The more recent case of Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility 
Services, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. 1991) is very similar to 
the present case. The workers in Gerardi were enveloped by a 
large cloud of asbestos dust during a pipe renovation 
project. The workers inhaled or ingested asbestos during 
that limited exposure. The workers in Gerardi, at the time 
of their complaint, were not currently suffering disease nor 
were they disabled. The Court, however, denied the 
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' cause of action for 
medical surveillance damages. The Court stated, "that the 
allowance of damages for medical monitoring expenses due to 
negligent exposure to toxic substances was granted on the 
basis that such a remedy would permit the early detection and 
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treatment of maladies that as a matter of public policy the 
tort-feasor should bear the cost". Gerardi, at 1004. 
Gerardi is very similar to the case at hand in that 
Plaintiffs have been negligently exposed to and ingested 
concentrated amounts of asbestos dust. Plaintiffs are a so 
currently suffering no visible disease or disability. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs should be allowed to recover for the 
necessary expenses of medical monitoring. At the very least 
a genuine issue of fact regarding the necessity and 
reasonableness of medical monitoring precludes summary 
judgment and this case should be remanded back to the trial 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated many issues of 
genuine fact. Accordingly, the District Court improperly 
dismissed their claims for personal injury and emotional 
distress. Plaintiffs1 claim for medical surveillance damages 
was also improperly dismissed. There is evidence before the 
court that medical monitoring for these Plaintiffs is 
reasonable and necessary because of their exposure to 
asbestos at Mountain Fuel. 
This case presents many public policy issues. We live in a 
"toxic age" wherein one entity's irresponsibility with toxic 
materials may result in the disease and early death of many 
persons. The tort system attempts to hold offenders 
responsible for their actions through deterrence and 
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compensation. When courts create •: - 4andari rf proof that Is 
;j i icoropa t1111 e •»i r i n i i J i ,' or una,.' d i f f i c u l t " * a c h i e v e , 
then it becomes the victims wno ar*5 * -• snig 
redress or legitimate and egregious harms., .md toxic 
irrespons i 11 i I M , i IMH mu v\\ il ;Liffs have surely 
been injured and certainly have reason worry about. ' \\a 
hit-urn, "Hut for" Mountain Fuels negligence, plaintiffs would 
not have been mjui ml , lei: :! enced the 
related emotional distress and now require medical monitoring 
I'.' I: rv-id'. U'IIP progress of eventually incurable disease :i n 
their bodies. 
;;\:;r *::>-> ^  reasons -•:«•• District C:;,rt's granting of 
i .-.-*- •..".' -*• Judgment should be reversed 
-:\a t.::e ,i:^ remanded to un, Distri llif"! 
proceedings. 
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